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WADE H. McCREE, JR.: A COMPASSIONATE
AND GREAT JUDGE
Horace W. Gilmore*

Wade H. McCree, Jr. served as a judge for nearly twenty-three
years. He served seven years as a Wayne County (Michigan) Circuit
Judge, six years as a United States District Judge, and ten years as a
United States Court of Appeals Judge.
He had great respect for the judiciary and its purpose in our society. He expressed this view in a speech to the Economic Club of Detroit on February 4, 1980, when he said:
Perhaps the real genius of our government is that in its least powerful
branch with its tradition of self restraint lies the safest potential for resolution of the most divisive issues in the unfinished agenda of our democracy. If this view is correct, then the judges are indeed the ultimate
guardians of our liberties. 1

Michigan Governor G. Mennen Williams first recognized Wade
McCree's talents when he appointed him to be a member of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in 1952. In 1954, Governor Williams named him a Judge of the Wayne County Circuit Court. 2 In
1961, President Kennedy appointed him to the federal bench in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. In
1966, President Johnson appointed Judge McCree to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Finally, in 1977, President
Carter appointed him to the position of United States Solicitor
General.

* Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan; Adjunct Lecturer of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B. 1939, J.D. 1942, University of Michigan. -Ed.
I wish to thank the following for their assistance: My two law clerks, Kristen Larcom and
Patrick Corbett; Hugh Munce (Detroit Legal News, Detroit); and the following former law
clerks of Judge McCree: Professor Maurice Kelman (Wayne State University Law School); Barbara Klarman (Tilchin & Hall, Farmington Hills); Howard Boigon (Davis, Graham & Stubbs,
Denver); Paul Levy (Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C.); D. Michael
Kratchman (Evans & Luptak, Detroit); Jerold D. E. Lax (Schlussel, Lifton, Simon, Rands, Galvin & Jackier, Ann Arbor); Darryl Anderson (O'Donnell, Schwartz & Anderson, Washington,
D.C.).
1. Detroit Legal News, Feb. 4, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
2. Judge McCree was the first Black ever appointed to the circuit court in Michigan. At the
time of his investiture, Governor Williams was approximately 20 minutes late in arriving and
was chastised by the then-presiding circuit judge for being late for the ceremony. Governor
Williams' response was most appropriate: "We have been waiting two hundred years for this
day, and I do not think twenty minutes more will matter very much."
231
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As Otis Smith, McCree's close friend, former Michigan Supreme
Court Justice, and General Counsel of General Motors, 3 stated at the
time of the Presentation of the Portrait of Judge McCree to the Sixth
Circuit in 1981:
When Judge McCree was later to stand the test of a county-wide election, his reputation for skill and fairness earned him endorsements from
many diverse and even mutually hostile groups and as a result he led all
others in the balloting.
. . . I know that when lawyers talked about the ablest and fairest trial
judges in Michigan, among the first to be named always was Judge Wade
Mccree. Wade was indeed a superb trial judge because he governed, so
to speak, not merely from rank but from intellect. His exchanges with
lawyers on some of the more metaphysical properties of the law are simply priceless. 4

From Wade McCree's first days on the Wayne County Circuit
Court bench through his service on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, he possessed a great sense of compassion, and uniformly sought
within the law to protect individuals and minorities against more powerful interests. He always ruled, however, within the law, and would
not bend it to protect anyone. He was totally and completely devoted
to the rule of law.
Unfortunately, none of Judge McCree's opinions as a Wayne
County Circuit Judge was published. As a judge in the United States
District Court, he wrote 19 published opinions, which can be found in
volumes 199 F. Supp. through 352 F. Supp. While on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, he wrote 223 published majority opinions,
which can be found in volumes 341 F.2d through 553 F.2d. During
the same period of time, he wrote 72 published dissents and 36 published concurrences.
He was probably the most respected judge of the Wayne County
Circuit Court during the period between 1956 and 1961, when I served
with him. He was even-handed, thoughtful, and scholarly in everything he did on the bench. He was very active in many of the bench
committees, serving on the Probation Committee, Friend of the Court
Committee, and others concerned with court administration.
Former Chief Judge Edwards, of the Sixth Circuit, speaking at the
Presentation of the Portrait of Judge McCree, described an episode
that was typical of McCree's career as a judge. Judge Edwards said:
I was waiting for an elevator when a lawyer left Judge McCree's court3. See 0. Smith, The Quintessemial Public Servant, 86 MICH. L. REV. 255 (1987).
4. Presentation of the Portrait of the Honorable Wade Mccree, Cincinnati, Ohio, June 11,
1981, reprinted in 725 F.2d C, CII, CIII (6th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Portrait Presentation].
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room and came to join me at the elevator. He was somewhat distraught
and without waiting, he burst out: "Well, he beat me. He beat me." then a pause - "But he made me like it." Throughout Judge McCree's
career, his gift for administering the law helped people to understand and accept it, even when losing. 5

Judge McCree's published decisions in the United States District
Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals show a man dedicated to
the law and compassionate in all of his dealings. I would like to discuss a few of his opinions, both at the district court level and the circuit court level, recognizing that in no way ·is this a comprehensive
treatment of his judicial work, but merely examples of his brilliance
and his concern for the protection of individual rights and the rule of
law.
I should point out generally that Judge McCree was a stickler for
language. He received excellent training at the Boston Latin School,
Fisk University, and Harvard Law School, and he used that education
in writing his opinions. He would go over opinions line by line with
his clerks, often taking hours to make sure that the language was perfect. 6 Moreover, he had a great sense of justice. He would never
knowingly issue an opinion that was not good law. While he always
strived to render a just decision protecting individual rights, he would
never bend the law.
One of the district court opinions of which Judge McCree was
most proud was United States v. Caplan. 7 In Caplan, defendants
moved to quash search warrants that were based in part on information received from a pen register that gave IRS agents information on
telephone numbers called. 8 The information obtained from these pen
registers was part of the basis for the issuance of the search warrants in
the case. Judge McCree granted the motions to suppress, finding that
the recording of the numbers was an interception within the meaning
of the law. He said:
I find that an "interception" took place under the circumstances here,
and that ... no authority can permit this. To the government's argument that no "communication" was intercepted, defendants, in open
court, demonstrated that it was possible to dial a number and to permit
5. Portrait Presentation, supra note 4, at CIV.
6. In Dixie Plantation Co. v. Duncan, 383 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1967), Judge McCree, writing
for the Sixth Circuit, affirmed a district court judgment, appealed by a tobacco producer, upholding a burley tobacco allotment by the county agricultural stabilization and conservation committee of 1.37 acres for the producer's farm. Though this was a very complex case, Judge McCree
was able to write a clear opinion in only two-and-a-half pages.
7. 255 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
8. A pen register is a device attached to a telephone line that records the number of every
outgoing telephone call. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1021 (5th ed. 1979).
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the phone to ring a specified number of times, and then to hang up.
When this was done, the pen register dutifully recorded the fact that the
number was called. History affords us the illustration of a pre-arranged
signal. Paul Revere's associate, who hung a lantern in the Old North
church, would hardly have been exculpated at a trial for treason if he
argued that he was not sending a communication, but was only illuminating the belfry. It seems that if the agents entertained no misgivings
about the use of the pen register constituting an "interception" here,
they would have frankly requested its employment instead of having resorted to the technique of stimulating the telephone company to do so by
suggestion. The government should not be permitted to instigate an investigation that is unlawful any more than it can instigate conduct that is
unlawful, as the entrapment cases teach. 9

This case broke new ground by finding that the pen register data,
where lines were capable of interstate transportation, violated wiretap
laws, and by extending the right of privacy through statutory construction. Caplan was totally consistent with Judge McCree's interest
in protecting the individual.
In another significant district court decision, Evans v. Kropp, 10 a
habeas corpus proceeding, a police guard had information concerning
the mental illness of a state prisoner. This information was never
transmitted to the sentencing judge by the prosecutor or defendant's
retained counsel. The sentencing judge accepted petitioner's plea of
guilty to second-degree murder, and sentenced him to life imprisonment after state remedies were exhausted. Petitioner filed a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which came before Judge
Mccree.
Judge McCree granted the writ, holding the proceedings did not
comport with due process. He found that the prosecutor was chargeable with the knowledge of the treating psychiatrist's diagnosis and
recommendation of a sanity hearing, which was communicated to
guards in charge of the prisoner in the hospital. He indicated his preference for protecting the individual rights of the accused against the
negligent failure of the government and the courts to find out the actual facts of the accused's condition. With regard to the accountability of the government, Judge McCree stated:
[T]he state is accountable for all information which comes within the
knowledge of its agents while prosecuting a criminal matter, so that the
knowledge of the police is clearly chargeable to the prosecutor, who is
also merely an agent of the state. 11

He also expanded the concept of effective assistance of counsel,
9. 255 F. Supp. at 808 (citations omitted).
IO. 254 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
11. 254 F. Supp. at 222.
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holding that an attorney's decision that his defendant would be far
better off in a state prison from which he would be eligible for parole
in ten years than he would be in a state hospital for the criminally
insane, which influenced the attorney's failure to notify the court of
the client's mental condition, deprived defendant of his guaranteed
rights under the fourteenth amendment. Judge McCree elaborated on
the role of an attorney:
I believe that no lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the right to make
such a judgment. Regardless of his personal views, he may not withhold
from the court such critical information as the diagnosed mental incompetency of his client and of his consequent possible inability to stand
trial. I find that Mr. O'Connell's failure to inform the court of his client's mental condition deprived petitioner of the effective assistance of
counsel which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 12

Once again, Judge Mccree showed his great concern for protecting
the rights of individuals within the law and the Constitution.
Judge McCree was also concerned with giving a plaintiff his day in
court, but only if this was possible within the bounds of the law. In
Gaetzi v. Carling Brewery Co., 13 a case cited numerous times, he dealt
with a conflicts of law issue over the proper statute of limitations in an
antitrust action. Plaintiff, a former distributor of beer, was suing the
brewery supplier for wrongful termination of the plaintiff's distributorship. The supplier moved for partial summary judgment on the
ground that the cause of action was barred by the four-year statute of
limitations applicable to private antitrust actions, 15 U.S.C. § 156.
Plaintiff asserted the six-year state statute of limitations applied. After
determining when the cause of action accrued, Judge McCree held
that the four-year statute applied, even though the cause of action accrued after the enactment date of the federal statute, but before its
effective date. Recognizing that Congress allowed a six-month grace
period before the effective date of the four-year statute to allow persons with viable claims under longer state limitations statutes to bring
suit, he noted that "plaintiff here was not in that position," and so he
applied the shorter limitations statute. 14 Here, plaintiff's cause of action accrued on November 7, 1955, the federal statute was effective
January 7, 1956, yet plaintiff did not bring suit until October 30, 1961.
On the other hand, if a plaintiff complied with the necessary statute of limitations, Judge McCree would rule within the law to allow
the parties to obtain fair results on the merits of the case. In Crowe v.
12. 254 F. Supp. at 222.
13. 205 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
14. 205 F. Supp. at 619.
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Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 15 Judge McCree wrote authoritatively on the right of a plaintiff to obtain production of crewmen's
statements taken on behalf of a railroad company immediately after an
accident, even though such crewmen were subject to deposition. He
found there was good cause for production of such statements, stating:
[D]iscovery should not be less available where relevant, non-privileged
information is contained in a document than when such information is
lodged in the memory of a witness .... In view of the liberal spirit of the
rules, the court should be disposed to grant such discovery as will accomplish full disclosure of facts, eliminate surprise, and promote
settlement.
. . . When both parties are apprised of all facts pertaining to a case,
the issues can be narrowed, the trial shortened, surprise avoided, and the
chances for a fair and amicable settlement enhanced. 16

Crowe has had a great influence in the development of the law of
discovery.
Judge McCree was effective in resolving disputes in chambers as
well as in the courtroom. In an unpublished case, Ross v. Bannan, 11
plaintiffs, inmates of a state prison and communicants of the Muslim
faith, brought suit under the federal Civil Rights Act alleging that the
prison authorities had denied plaintiffs permission to receive, or order
by mail, copies of the Muslims' daily prayer book, and that the authorities had refused to permit plaintiffs "to correspond with their spiritual
leader." In a conference in chambers, Judge McCree moved the parties to an understanding in this highly sensitive dispute. The officials
agreed to allow plaintiffs to receive their prayer books, and agreed that
plaintiffs could correspond with their spiritual advisor, but subject to
the same controls as other prison inmates. Through his dispute resolution skills, Judge McCree helped the parties reach a fair, equitable,
and speedy agreement.
If a plaintiff appeared to have a viable claim, Judge Mccree would
broadly construe the jurisdiction of the federal court. In Chovan v.
E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co., 18 he wrote authoritatively on the effect
of a state long-arm statute on limited personal jurisdiction. Chovan
involved a diversity action in Michigan for the death of a miner killed
by the premature explosion of dynamite. Mccree held that the longarm statute allowed exercising jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
that annually loaded about fifteen million feet of fuse exceeding
15.
16.
17.
18.

29 F.R.D. 148 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
29 F.R.D. at 150-51.
No. 21429 (E.D. Mich. June 4, 1962).
217 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
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$130,000 in value onto common carriers destined for points in Michigan. He held these contacts with Michigan were sufficient to subject
the company to limited personal jurisdiction. 19
Judge McCree's appointment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1966 was uniformly hailed as an outstanding one. He had established a solid record as a legal scholar
deeply devoted to the law and the Constitution, and at all times anxious to protect individual rights. He wrote many significant opinions
as an appellate judge, and, in this short tribute, I can only briefly discuss a few of them.
One of the most significant was Mitchell v. Johnson, 2 0 a habeas
corpus case. The district court had denied the writ, which raised the
question of whether an indigent prisoner has a right to appointed
counsel after the first appeal in state court has been exhausted, and the
only remedy remaining in state court was the seeking of leave to appeal from the State Supreme Court for a discretionary review. Judge
Mccree reversed, on behalf of a unanimous court, finding the government's argument not persuasive that, because appellant had already
taken one appeal with the aid of counsel, the Constitution required no
more. Significantly, he said:
The temple of criminal justice does not have three stories for the affluent
and only two for the indigent. We conclude that the constitutional principles enunciated in Griffin, Burns and Douglas require appointment of
counsel to assist indigent appellants in application to the Michigan
Supreme Court for discretionary review. Our decision is supported by
the spirit, if not by the express command, of the Sixth Amendment right
to assistance of counsel, applicable to the states in the Fourteenth
Amendment. 21

Judge McCree was most meticulous in protecting the rights of defendants, as well as those of the government, in criminal procedural
matters. He was very interested in criminal procedure, and particularly desirous to see that the state at no time would overreach to send
a defendant to jail.
An interesting case on this subject is Johns v. Perini, 22 which involved an appeal from a district court's deni1;1l of a writ of habeas
corpus. After reviewing the transcript of the state trial court proceedings, Judge Mccree noted that the record disclosed the existence of
documentary evidence that would have supported petitioner's defense
of an alibi, yet no attempt had been made to introduce such evidence
19.
20.
21.
22.

217
488
488
440

F. Supp. at 813.
F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1973).
F.2d at 353.
F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972).
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after objection by the prosecuting attorney. The transcript was insufficient, according to Judge Mccree, to determine whether the petitioner
had been denied effective assistance of counsel, and required an evidentiary hearing. He held:
Although it appears that the trial court could, under the Ohio statute,
have excluded even appellant's own alibi testimony . . . it apparently
exercised its statutory discretion to permit Johns to testify. It is not clear
whether defense counsel made a tactical decision not to introduce the
documentary evidence or whether he was precluded from doing so because he had neglected to give the statutory notice. In the latter event,
since this was appellant's only defense, issuance of the writ would be
dictated . . . .23

The court then remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether
a negligent omission by counsel precluded presentation of evidence of
an alibi in support of appellant's only defense. Once more, Judge Mccree showed his deep concern for the protection of individual rights,
and insisted upon adequate judicial procedures.
In many criminal cases, Judge McCree was often the dissenter. 24
In every one of such cases, he was concerned with procedural flaws or
denial of a defendant's constitutional rights. In United States v.
Hoffa, 25 he dissented from affirmance of the conviction because of the
possibility that the prosecuting attorney may have relied upon perjured testimony in the case. He pointed out that, had the government
revealed that the witness had perjured himself during the trial, defense
counsel could have used that fact to impeach a key government witness. He found the majority opinion unconvincing on that point, and
felt that the prosecutor's actions may have denied the defendant due
process.
Judge McCree wrote in every area of the law, and always lucidly,
concisely, and effectively. In Davis v. School District of Pontiac, 26
Judge McCree, writing for the court, affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that the record supported the determination that
school officials were responsible for the racial imbalance in the school
system, including the purposeful segregation in the administration and
faculty. He stated the district court properly fulfilled its duty to eradicate the effects of past unlawful discrimination. Judge McCree wrote
23. 440 F.2d at 579 (citations omitted).
24. See, e.g., Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1251 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
922 (1972) (McCree, J., dissenting) (contending that a strike force of police officers and IRS
agents had conducted an illegal search of defendant's home).
25. 437 F.2d 11 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
26. 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971).
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this opinion, which showed great courage and incisive scholarship,
during the school busing crises throughout the country.
Judge McCree was also concerned with the protection of the environment, as was exemplified in Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority. 27 Writing for the court, he affirmed a district
court's granting of a preliminary injunction to stop construction of the
TVA's dam and reservoir project. Judge McCree held that an environmental impact statement is required whenever a governmental agency
intends to take steps that will result in significant environmental impact, whether the steps were planned before or after the effective date
of the National Environmental Protection Act, and even if the steps
represent the final stages of the government plan.
Judge McCree further showed his concern for civil rights, and the
protection of basic constitutional rights, in Glasson v. City of Louisville. 28 In Glasson, a police officer forcibly took a poster from a young
woman, peacefully standing on a public sidewalk, and destroyed it. It
was a protest sign, and she was standing on a motorcade route that the
President of the United States would soon be travelling. Action was
brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) for abridgement of
rights guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. The district court, sitting without a jury, determined, after trial, that appellant could not recover damages under § 1983 because the police had
acted reasonably in destroying her poster, and she would not recover
damages under§ 1985(3) because she failed to prove that the destruction of her poster was motivated by an impermissible discriminatory
animus. The poster, which she was holding peacefully while waiting
for the President to pass, said: "Lead us to hate and kill poverty, disease and ignorance, not each other." Judge McCree, writing for the
Court, reversed, in an eloquent opinion:
To permit police officers to prohibit the expression of ideas which they
believe to be "detrimental" or "injurious" to the President of the United
States or to punish for incitement or breach of the peace the peaceful
communication of such messages because other persons are provoked
and seek to take violent action against the speaker would subvert the
First Amendment, and would incorporate into that constitutional guarantee a "heckler's veto" which would empower an audience to cut off the
expression of a speaker with whom it disagreed ....
. . . Miss Glasson ... was engaged in activity protected by the First
Amendment and ... the destruction of the sign by Louisville police officers ... deprived her of that right. 2 9
27. 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
28. 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975).
29. 518 F.2d at 905·06 (footnote omitted). Judge McCree was not reluctant to dissent in
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Judge McCree did not hesitate to discuss important constitutional
principles in his opinions, such as federalism and the separation of
powers. United States v. Carson 30 was a suit by the government
against a borrower under a federal loan program, and a livestock broker, who, upon borrower's request, sold livestock in which the government held a mortgage interest. The broker retained only a percentage
of the proceeds, amounting to his commission. Under state law, the
government could only recover from the broker that percentage.
Judge McCree, writing for the majority, reversed the district court,
holding that federal law applied and that the broker was liable to the
government for the fair market value of the livestock at the time of the
conversion. Leading into his analysis of federalism, Judge McCree
commented: "Far more is involved here than a few head of cattle.
This case raises serious issues both of federalism and of the separation
of powers of the branches of the federal government."31 He followed
that with an extensive and scholarly analysis of federalism:
Where a decision is likely to have a substantial effect on the implementation of a federal program, then a federal court should declare a rule consistent with the program's demands. Congress, of course, is the primary
source of federal law, and the federal courts must adhere to the intent of
Congress whenever this intent is discernible. When congressional intent
is not expressed or otherwise ascertainable, however, the courts may,
within reasonable bounds, utilize the techniques of the common law to
reach the appropriate rules for disposition of controversies before
them ....
. . . The presence of a federal program permits the federal courts to
make a choice, but does not of itself determine what the choice will be.
In the instant situation, however, formulation of a uniform federal rule,
rather than adoption of the laws of the several states as the federal rule,
is the more appropriate alternative. 32

In another interesting case, Stifel v. Hopkins, 33 a federal prisoner
brought a diversity action against his parents and the attorney who
represented him throughout criminal proceedings. The district court
held that the prisoner could not acquire domicile in the state of his
incarceration, and thus dismissed the action for lack of diversity jurisorder to protect civil rights when he felt that individuals were being deprived of constitutional
protections. See, e.g.. Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977) (male
worker discharged for violating code prohibiting long hair for male employees); Robinson v.
Shelby Co. Bd. of Educ., 467 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1972) (defining extent of constitutional man·
date for desegregation).
30. 372 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1967).
31. 372 F.2d at 431.
32. 372 F.2d at 432.
33. 477 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1973).
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diction. Judge McCree, writing for the majority, reversed, holding
that "a litigant will not be precluded from establishing a domicile
within a state for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction solely because his presence there initially resulted from circumstances beyond
his control."34 Once more, Judge McCree showed his practical approach to judicial problems, protecting the rights of individuals to
have their day in court.
Two more opinions, one a dissent and one a concurring opinion,
deserve comment. In Clinton Street Greater Bethlehem Church v. City
of Detroit, 35 the majority affirmed a master's denial of certification of
the church's membership in a class of persons entitled to recover for
losses sustained due to the city's condemnation proceedings, thus denying the church damage recovery. In dissent, Judge McCree held
that the record was inadequate for the master to make such a determination, and that the case should be remanded to the master for findings concerning the value of the church's property as of the time of the
takings. With his usual eloquence, Judge McCree started his dissent by
stating: "If anything is clear from a study of the voluminous record in
this case, it is that the [church] has been pillaged and despoiled in the
past two decades as thoroughly as any ancient city at the onslaught of
raiding barbarians. "36
In Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education, 37 the majority affirmed a district court's choice of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's plan for school desegregation. The plan had
allegedly placed the burden of desegregation disproportionately on
black students and their parents. Judge McCree concurred, stating,
inter alia, that "[o]ur opinion should not be construed in any way as a
qualification of the principle that a district court has an obligation to
endeavor to distribute the burden of integration equitably on all races
and that any deviation from this norm, without a compelling justification, is impermissible." 38 Judge McCree explained that the court did
not address this issue in order to insure that at least some kind of plan
was in effect:
I agree that we should not now disturb the District Court's approval of
the HEW plan and possibly encourage the kind of delay and inaction
that has caused this case to pend for 17 years. Plaintiffs may seek modification of the court's order on the ground that the plan places a dispro34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

477
484
484
463
463

F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

at 1126.
185 (6th Cir. 1973).
at 189.
732 (6th Cir. 1972).
at 752.
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portionate burden on black children and their parents, and this issue can
be litigated and determined before the beginning of the 1972-73 school
year. In this way, the disproportionate burden asserted by plaintiffs will
exist at most for only a short period of time and will amount to no more
than a transitory phase (assuming the absence of sufficient justification
for maintaining it permanently) in the over-all creation of a unitary
school system. 39

What appeared to be approval of a faulty desegregation plan by Judge
Mccree and the Sixth Circuit was actually a big step toward a unitary
school system.
Wade McCree was not only an outstanding judge, he was deeply
dedicated to the improvement of the law, and active in many law-related activities. He served for many years on the Executive Committee of the American Law Institute, was a Fellow of the American Bar
Foundation, and a member of numerous boards and commissions devoted to the improvement of the law. I served with him on two of
these. He and I were both members of the Advisory Committee for
Appellate Justice. This committee, made up of legal scholars, judges
(both trial and appellate level), and lawyers, was concerned with improving the efficiency of the appellate procedure. The Committee met
for a period of two years and ultimately issued a very comprehensive
report, to which Judge McCree made significant contributions.
I also served with him as a member of the Board of the Institute
for Court Management. The Institute was largely responsible for developing the profession of court administration, and most Court Administrators today are Fellows of the Institute. Judge McCree was an
excellent member of the Board. He attended meetings without fail,
and always was most constructive in his comments. The Board was
much more effective because of him.
In addition, Judge McCree was very much interested in continuing
judicial education, and served for a long period of time as a member of
the Board of the National Judicial College at the University of Nevada. This group is the premier training group for state trial and appellate judges in the country, and runs some forty different programs
every year. It is largely responsible for elevating the quality of the
state judiciary. As a very effective and active member of its board,
Judge McCree made major and significant contributions to the improvement of continuing judicial education.
In an article as short as this one, it is impossible to thoroughly
analyze and present Judge McCree's contributions to the jurisprudence of this country. Suffice it to say that they are significant and
39. 463 F.2d at 752.
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great. Judge McCree was, above all, a fine lawyer and a fine judge. He
was always concerned with protecting the constitutional rights of all,
no matter how insignificant the rights and individuals appeared to be.
As Judge Lively says in his eloquent tribute: "He was surely born to
be ajudge." 40 Nothing truer could be said about Wade H. McCree, Jr.
The bench lost a great judge when he left it to become Solicitor General.41 He was missed then, and he is missed today.

40. See Lively, Wade H. McCree, Jr.: Born To Be A Judge, 86 MICH. L. REV. 249 (1987).
41. Judge McCree often told me that he thought the Solicitor General's job was the best
lawyer's job in the country. In saying this, he always emphasized that it was the best lawyer's
job. He made no effort to compare it to the judiciary, and often longed to return to the bench.
He often quoted his daughter Kathy as asking him why he would give up a life tenancy to take a
tenancy at will when he became Solicitor General. He said to me many times he really had no
good answer to that question.

